INTEGRITY-BASED TRUST VIOLATIONS WITHIN HUMAN-MACHINE TEAMING by Clark, Tiffany
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items
2018-06
INTEGRITY-BASED TRUST VIOLATIONS WITHIN
HUMAN-MACHINE TEAMING
Clark, Tiffany
Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/59637
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.













Thesis Advisor: Brian S. Bingham 
Co-Advisor: Mollie R. McGuire 
 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE  
Form Approved OMB 
No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of 
information.  Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including 
suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 
Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction 
Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503.




3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
Master's thesis
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
INTEGRITY-BASED TRUST VIOLATIONS WITHIN HUMAN-MACHINE 
TEAMING
5. FUNDING NUMBERS
6. AUTHOR(S) Tiffany Clark
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)











11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
A
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
 Successful human-machine teaming requires humans to trust machines. While many claim to welcome 
automation, there is also mistrust of machines which may stem from more than competence concerns. 
Human-automation trust research to date has considered automation capable of competence-based trust 
violations (CBTV), but integrity-based trust violations (IBTV) should also be studied. Future advances in 
artificial intelligence and cyber warfare could result in the perception—and possible reality—of automation 
committing IBTVs. The current study paired human participants with an automated teammate to complete a 
sequence of computer-based visual search and investment tasks. During each session, the automation 
committed either an IBTV or CBTV, and participants’ trust responses were measured through self-reported 
trust, trust-based reliance behavior, time spent making reliance decisions, and investment behavior. The 
results found that (a) average self-reported trust in the automation was significantly lower in the IBTV than 
the CBTV condition, (b) personal investment behavior was more consistent with reported trust levels than 
reliance behavior and may be a better gauge of trust, and (c) trust behavior differed more between IBTV and 
CBTV conditions among participants who invested more in their automated teammate. The differences 
found in participant trust response between conditions are enough to warrant further research into how 
humans react to automation committing IBTVs. 
14. SUBJECT TERMS
human-machine teaming, human-systems interaction, human-robot teaming, man-machine 
interface, human-computer interaction, human-robot interaction, trust in automation, 
human-automation trust, integrity-based trust violation, competence-based trust violation
15. NUMBER OF

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18
i 
85
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
ii 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
INTEGRITY-BASED TRUST VIOLATIONS WITHIN HUMAN-MACHINE 
TEAMING 
Tiffany Clark 
Lieutenant, United States Navy 
BS, University of Washington, 2009 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN MECHANICAL ENGINEERING 
from the 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
June 2018 
Approved by: Brian S. Bingham 
 Advisor 
 Mollie R. McGuire 
 Co-Advisor 
 Garth V. Hobson 
 Chair, Department of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering 
iii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
iv 
ABSTRACT 
 Successful human-machine teaming requires humans to trust machines. While 
many claim to welcome automation, there is also mistrust of machines which may stem 
from more than competence concerns. Human-automation trust research to date has 
considered automation capable of competence-based trust violations (CBTV), but 
integrity-based trust violations (IBTV) should also be studied. Future advances in 
artificial intelligence and cyber warfare could result in the perception—and possible 
reality—of automation committing IBTVs. The current study paired human participants 
with an automated teammate to complete a sequence of computer-based visual search and 
investment tasks. During each session, the automation committed either an IBTV or 
CBTV, and participants’ trust responses were measured through self-reported trust, 
trust-based reliance behavior, time spent making reliance decisions, and investment 
behavior. The results found that (a) average self-reported trust in the automation was 
significantly lower in the IBTV than the CBTV condition, (b) personal investment 
behavior was more consistent with reported trust levels than reliance behavior and may 
be a better gauge of trust, and (c) trust behavior differed more between IBTV and CBTV 
conditions among participants who invested more in their automated teammate. The 
differences found in participant trust response between conditions are enough to warrant 
further research into how humans react to automation committing IBTVs. 
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Human-machine teaming (HMT) has become a buzzword within the U.S. 
military, and for good reason. The U.S. Third Offset Strategy focuses on five key 
technological areas: “autonomous learning systems, human-machine collaborative 
decision-making, assisted human operations, advanced manned-unmanned systems 
operations, and network-enabled autonomous weapons and high-speed projectiles” [1]. 
The Department of Defense’s (DOD) Unmanned Systems Roadmap for 2013-2038 [2] 
points out an ongoing transition within automation research, from developing automatic 
systems which still need human control to developing autonomous systems that react and 
make decisions with no human control. Stated another way, the Roadmap shows that the 
U.S. military is moving from all-human teams in full control of their respective machines 
to humans teaming with self-directed autonomous systems which choose behaviors to 
follow in pursuit of a human-directed goal. Finally, the 2016 Defense Science Board 
Summer Study on Autonomy concluded that “DoD must take immediate action to 
accelerate its exploitation of autonomy” [3]. 
The plans are clear: autonomous machines are coming, and human-machine teams 
will be a staple of future U.S. military operations. The research is in progress and the 
machines are ever closer to being ready. But how ready are the soldiers, sailors, and 
airmen who will be the “human” part of these human-machine teams?  
Humans may not be as ready for HMT as many think. A 2016 survey of 2,000 
people in New York found that while 81 percent of people are excited about an 
automated life, 73 percent say they are scared to trust machines [4]. What exactly are 
people afraid of when it comes to trusting machines? One could guess they fear machines 
failing to perform their specified operation correctly—a matter of competence. Yet a 
definite majority of people in the United States already entrust their lives, and often also 
the lives of those they love, to the proper operation of motor vehicles, elevators, and 
many other machines that could be considered mortally dangerous. If placing one’s life in 
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another’s hands is considered an act of trust at the highest level, then people who use 
motor vehicles and elevators must trust the competence of machines to some degree. 
Why then would they say they are scared to trust machines? 
This apparent contradiction could be explained by the presence of another facet of 
trust—one based on integrity or benevolence rather than competence. Given the choice of 
undergoing surgery by one of two doctors with equal skill level, what other factors would 
influence the decision? If one doctor was known for charitable weekend work and the 
other had been convicted of tax fraud, would that sway the choice? If competence were 
all that mattered, perhaps not. Yet in many situations, competence is not the only factor 
behind a decision to trust. The next question, then, is whether this same type of analogy 
can be applied to the machines people say they are afraid to trust. Can one weigh the 
integrity or benevolence of machines as a factor in decisions to trust, or does that only 
apply to humans? What about weighing the integrity of humans behind the machines, 
such as operators or programmers? Does that have the same effect as thinking that 
machines themselves are capable of having or displaying integrity? 
Human-machine teams will not function well if humans do not appropriately trust 
or rely on the machines, and clearly there is much still to be learned about the complex 
dynamics of trust between humans and automation in pursuit of that appropriate trust. 
Specifically, it seems there is little known about human responses to trust violations 
through a failure of automation integrity or benevolence as opposed to failures through 
automation competence. The current study attempts to discover if these human responses 
differ by assessing human trust in automation after either a competence-based or 
integrity-based trust violation. 
B. TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 
A short introduction to some of the oft-used terms within the Trust in Automation 
field of study will help ensure maximum clarity in the discussions to come. 
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1. Automation 
Commonly referenced as either degrees or levels of automation, Sheridan and 
Verplank [5] developed a specific scale varying actions between a human and an 
undersea teleoperator, ranging from level one (human performs decision-making and 
starts the automation on a pre-determined task), to level nine (automation decides 
everything about the task, implements action, and does not tell the human what it did). 
Figure 1 shows the full scale as presented by Sheridan and Verplank, and while the scale 
specifically mentions a computer, the computer’s role is generalized to mean any 
automation for this paper. 
 
Figure 1.  Degrees (or Levels) of Automation. Source: [5]. 
In terms of Sheridan and Verplank’s scale, “automation” and “machine” as 
discussed in the current study would include level two or above. 
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A more recent and more general scale developed by Endsley and Kiris [6] (Figure 
2) includes only five levels of control, but still shows increasing automation control with 
increasing level number. 
 
Figure 2.  Levels of Control in Automation. Source: [6]. 
The terms “automation” and “machine” as used in this thesis would include level 
two or above within Endsley and Kiris’s scale. While there is a recognized difference 
between automatic and autonomous machines, this study is intended to be broad in 
including everything from low-level, automatic functions (such as automated financial 
payments) up to high-level, fully autonomous systems, including those with Artificial 
Intelligence (AI) software (such as self-driving cars). 
2. Trust in Automation 
It may be a small word, but “trust” can cover a large array of different meanings, 
layers, and uses. For this paper, trust is defined as Lee and See [7] defined it: “the attitude 
that an agent will help achieve an individual’s goals in a situation characterized by 
uncertainty and vulnerability.” 
Although it is often portrayed as a state, the act of trusting is a dynamic process, 
and some authors, such as Hoffman [8], choose to use the word “trusting” rather than 
“trust”. Not only is trust changing over time, Hoffman also points out that there are 
myriad different types of trusting that appear in different situations and for different 
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individuals. As Hoff and Bashir [9] modeled, trust can be seen as a three-layered 
construct, consisting of variable influences from an individual’s Dispositional Trust, 
Situational Trust, and Learned Trust (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3.  Three-Layered Framework for Trust Variability. Source: [9]. 
Hoff and Bashir [9] explain that each of these three trust layers also has its own 
influences, which can change over time and are what helps make trusting a dynamic 
process. The first layer these researchers explain is Dispositional Trust, which is 
considered to be more enduring than the other two and is influenced mainly by things 
such as culture, age, gender, and individual personality traits (Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4.  Factors Influencing Dispositional Trust. Source [9]. 
Several dispositional trust factors were measured for participants in this study, 
including age, gender, overall comfort with automation, and the tendency to trust swiftly 
without specific reason. With high participation levels, these factors were expected to 
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simply model a natural variation of dispositional trust within the human population. If 
anomalies or trends were found during analyses, an imbalance in dispositional trust 
factors within the study population could help explain the source. 
Situational Trust as put forth by Hoff and Bashir [9] is more dynamic between 
different situations and is influenced by factors both internal and external to an individual 
(Figure 5). One important aspect the researchers noted about situational trust is that aside 
from influencing trust, these factors also influence the degree of correlation between an 
individual’s trust (as an attitude) and his or her subsequent behavior (such as reliance, 
discussed later). 
 
Figure 5.  Factors Influencing Situational Trust. Source [9]. 
Internal variability factors of Situational Trust measured for participants in this 
study include self-efficacy, gaming tendencies, and mood both before and after the main 
experiment exercise. External variability factors such as task difficulty and perceived 
risks or benefits were carefully considered in the design of the experiment (explained 
further in Chapter III), but these were static within the experiment, and should have 
varied only with regard to each participant’s individual abilities or perceptions. 
Learned Trust, the last of Hoff and Bashir’s three levels [9], represents a 
culmination of both long-term, past experiences (called initial learned trust) and more 
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immediate, current experiences with the automation in use (called dynamic learned trust). 
Figure 6 shows how initial learned trust influences an individual’s initial reliance 
strategy, but dynamic learned trust tends to exert more influence as an individual interacts 
with automation, according to the researchers. They also explain that dashed arrows in 
the figure represent the ability of those factors to change with each interaction. 
 
Figure 6.  Factors Influencing Learned Trust. Source: [9]. 
The trust violations committed by the automation in this experiment would fall 
into the category of dynamic learned trust, specifically as part of system performance. 
Since this affects trust levels with each interaction, reliance behavior and response time 
measurements (both discussed in the Measurements section of Chapter III) were taken in 
an attempt to gauge participants’ trust in an iterative fashion. Performance of the 
automation is held constant in the study, as are transparency, feedback, and other system 
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metrics which can affect trust. The type of trust violation experienced is the only 
manipulated variable in this experiment, as the intent is to study how this changes human 
perception of the automation and subsequent reliance behaviors as indicators of trust. 
3. Trust Violations 
Lee and Moray [10] categorized the many facets of trust in automation by 
performance measures (e.g., competence, reliability), process measures (e.g., integrity, 
predictability, dependability), and perceived purpose (e.g., benevolence, loyalty, faith). 
The purpose these researchers discuss is based on the perceived benevolence or loyalty of 
the humans who designed the automation rather than pertaining to the automation itself.  
This thesis compares human responses to violations of trust with regard to Lee 
and Moray’s categories [10], except that the three categories are split between two 
different types of trust violation. A competence-based trust violation (CBTV) represents a 
failure of either performance or process, and an integrity-based trust violation (IBTV) 
represents a failure of purpose. 
While the word “integrity” included in the process category would seem to 
indicate that process failures should be under IBTVs, Lee and Moray [10] use the word to 
mean that the automation is acting as expected (predictability), which for this study is 
more closely related to competence. When used in general conversation regarding 
humans, the word “integrity” often signifies a certain level of moral or ethical 
considerations, and that is the way it is used in this paper. With this in mind, IBTVs in 
this study are more in line with a failure of perceived purpose than a failure of process. 
An example of a CBTV between humans would be if one person is asked to hold 
money for another, but accidentally loses it. This person’s reliability and dependability 
would certainly be called into question—a failure of performance and process. If instead, 
the person simply decided not to return the money, this person’s benevolence and loyalty 
would be questioned—a failure of purpose, which could be called an IBTV. Similar 
examples using automation can be described in terms of an Automated Teller Machine 
(ATM). If one machine displayed an error message and failed to dispense money upon 
request, this could be called a CBTV. If another machine just next to the first also failed 
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to dispense money, but did not display an error message and also deducted the amount 
from your bank account, this could be perceived as an IBTV. While these could both be 
called a failure of performance or process, the second scenario has an element of 
perceived purpose that is also called into question. 
Regardless of how trust violations are defined, each violation will ultimately be 
categorized by how the human in receipt of the violation perceives it. One real-life 
example of this is when Amazon’s Alexa recorded a woman’s private conversation from 
an Echo in her home and then emailed the audio file of it to one of the woman’s contacts 
[11]. This can easily be explained as a failure of performance in which Alexa mistook 
conversation as a series of commands, but it is also easy to see how the woman in this 
story could instead perceive it as a failure of purpose, and subsequently lose trust based 
on that perception. 
4. Reliance 
As an attitude, trust itself is difficult to measure aside from subjective ratings. 
Often more objective measures, such as reliance, are taken to reflect an assumed level of 
trust [12]. Reliance for this thesis is defined as an objective, measurable behavior in 
which a human chooses to submit an answer given by the automation over their own 
initial answer. An individual’s choice to rely on automation is likely not based solely on 
their trust of that automation. Or, as pointed out by Lee and See [7], “Trust guides—but 
does not completely determine—reliance.” Although reliance and trust are not 
synonymous, van Dongen and van Maanen [12] point out that reliance often reflects the 
relative difference between trust in one’s own ability and trust in an aid. In this way, 
reliance—an objectively measurable metric—can be seen as an indicator of the more 
subjective level of trust. 
5. Appropriate Reliance and Calibrated Trust 
Regardless of whether a team is fully human or part automation, team 
performance is best when there is “appropriate” reliance, which stems from properly 
calibrated trust as put forth by Lee and See [7]. Trust is considered properly calibrated 
according to Muir [13] when a person’s level of trust in automation matches well with the 
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automation’s actual capabilities. In practice, once trust is properly calibrated, a person 
would trust the automation when it is trustworthy, and would not trust the automation 
when it is untrustworthy. 
Appropriate reliance within a human-machine team would occur when a human 
chose to rely on automation if reliance would benefit team performance, and chose not to 
rely on the automation if reliance would detriment team performance. Because situations 
often prevent humans from knowing whether reliance will benefit or detriment the team 
until after the reliance decision is made, properly calibrated trust is needed to effectively 
guide these decisions. Appropriate reliance stands in contrast to either misuse (over-
reliance; relying when automation performs poorly) or disuse (under-reliance; not relying 




II. TOPIC DISCUSSION 
Beginning with a review of pertinent trust-in-automation literature, this chapter 
highlights a small gap in research and discusses why the topic deserves more attention. 
A. HUMAN-SYSTEMS INTEGRATION 
Human-machine teaming is a subject which not only considers how humans and 
machines operate as separate entities, but also considers details of the relationship and 
interactions that occur between these entities in a team environment. A field of study at 
the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) which specializes in this type of relationship is 
Human-Systems Integration (HSI). One HSI model, originally published in an NPS thesis 
by U.S. Coast Guard LCDR Mike O’Neil [15], is helpful in visualizing the integration of 
humans and technology into a complete system. This model has been further developed 
by HSI faculty and students at NPS [16], and is shown in its adapted state in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7.  HSI Model. Source: [15]. 
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Sometimes referred to as a “zipper,” model, Figure 7 shows how integration is 
most effective when technological affordances are designed to “bridge the gap” in areas 
where humans may have limitations, such as processing speed or the need to disengage 
from a task in order to sleep. Humans in turn can offer unique capabilities that technology 
either cannot or does not yet perform. These capabilities allow humans to “bridge the 
gap” in areas where technology is constrained. In HMT, the best teams will be those in 
which the “zipper” covers all gaps—where the strengths of humans complement the 
weaknesses of machines and vice versa. 
Many technological constraints that used to exist are now obsolete, or at least of 
little concern. Wireless technology cut the tethers that used to make machines immobile, 
and smaller, faster information processors have massively reduced the size and weight 
necessary for adequate computing power. Humans no longer have to do much to bridge 
the gap in these areas. With developments in Artificial Intelligence (AI), many machines 
are now performing tasks that used to require humans, such as conversing with other 
humans. Google recently demonstrated this ability in a new feature being developed for 
Google Assistant, called Google Duplex [17]. In the demonstration, Google Duplex 
called a restaurant and made a dinner reservation—even responding appropriately when 
the conversation took an unexpected turn. 
Technological developments may be eradicating constraints at a rapid pace, 
producing machines that can walk, talk, and even think for humans, but technology 
cannot trust for humans. If human-machine teams are to function well, humans have to 
help bridge the gap when it comes to trust. Technology is constrained in how far it can 
extend across that trust gap, and so this study focuses on the other side of the zipper—
extending the human capability of trust in automation to meet that constraint. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The broad field of “Trust in Automation” can be broken down into many smaller 
areas of research. Hancock, Billings, Schaefer, Chen, de Visser and Parasuraman [18] 
performed a meta-analysis focused on determining what research has found about factors 
that most affect trust levels, looking at human factors (workload, individual traits, etc.), 
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automation factors (reliability, anthropomorphism, etc.), and environmental factors (task 
type, time pressure, etc.). This analysis looked at human-robot relationships specifically, 
but a second meta-analysis by Shaefer, Chen, Szalma and Hancock [19] looked at trust 
between humans and automation in general. Both meta-analyses found that automation-
related factors (specifically those related to performance) had the largest relative effect on 
trust in comparison to human or environmental factors. Bansal and Zahedi [20] as well as 
Paeng, Wu, and Boerkoel [21] extended their view past the initial trust development 
phase, looking at the effect of these automation factors through trust violations and 
subsequent attempts to repair trust. 
Perhaps because performance-related factors were found to have the largest effect 
on trust, research into the break-down of human-automation trust has looked 
predominately at competence-based trust violations (CBTV) as the culprit, focusing on 
varying levels of automation reliability and performance. One example is a study done by 
Chavaillaz, Wastell and Sauer [22] in which participants worked with automation that 
performed either at 60 percent, 80 percent, or 100 percent reliability. Findings from this 
study were that participants in the lower system reliability groups reported lower levels of 
trust; interestingly, there did not seem to be corresponding low levels of reliance on the 
automation. In another study, de Visser, Monfort, McKendrick, Smith, McKnight, 
Krueger and Parasuraman [23], conducted a study where participants received advice 
from either a computer, avatar, or human agent which gradually decreased in reliability. 
While this study was more focused on how anthropomorphism affected resistance to 
breakdowns in trust (known as trust resilience), it was once again reliability—a 
performance measure rather than process or purpose—which caused the breakdown in 
trust. 
Hoffman [8] points out that despite some known or assumed differences, the 
human-automation trust framework is thought of as relatively similar to the human-
human trust framework. Borrowing then from human-human trust violation literature, 
there are several studies incorporating integrity-based trust violations (IBTV) as well as 
competence-based violations. A series of experiments performed by Kim, Cooper, Dirks 
and Ferrin [24-27] had participants watch videos of job interviews in which job 
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applicants were asked by the interviewer about an accounting-related mistake from a 
previous job. Applicants were either accused of a competence-based error in which the 
mistake was attributed to lack of knowledge, or an integrity-based violation in which the 
mistake was intentionally committed. Participants in the studies then completed other 
tasks, but with perceptions in place based on either the competence-based or integrity-
based trust violation. 
At the time of this paper, searches have yielded little in the way of research 
studying human responses to automation that commits an integrity-based trust violation. 
One study by Bansal and Zahedi [20] looked at responses to release of an individual’s 
private data online, either as a result of cyber hacking or from company personnel 
intentionally choosing to share information in an unauthorized fashion. In this study, the 
hacking could be seen as a CBTV because the company failed to protect the information 
as expected, and the unauthorized sharing could be seen as an IBTV because the data 
were intentionally shared. This is the closest example of automation committing an IBTV 
found, yet the study attributes the intentional violation to a company employee—a 
human—rather than to any level of automation. 
Why might it be assumed that inter-human trust can be breached through either a 
CBTV or an IBTV, but human-automation trust can only be breached by a CBTV? 
Perhaps the thought is that since automation is not capable of intent or purpose, it cannot 
intentionally or purposefully violate an established boundary and so cannot commit an 
IBTV. Some experts in the field argue explicitly that “automation lacks intentionality” 
[7]. Until recently, this reasoning very likely was obvious and sound. Yet with 
progressing developments in AI and ever-increasing skillsets of cyber hackers, that 
assumption may need a second look. 
C. POSSIBLE GAP IN THE LITERATURE 
In the DOD Unmanned Systems Roadmap [2], the section outlining plans for 
development in autonomy and cognitive behavior discusses shifting from autonomous 
mission execution to autonomous mission performance, with the difference essentially 
being the level of ability to make decisions in uncertain, non-binary situations. It states: 
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“The human brain can function in dynamic environments and adapt to changes as well as 
predict what will happen next. In simplistic terms, the algorithms must act as the human 
brain does” [2]. 
If the goal of AI is to approximate the way a human mind would work, only faster 
and more efficiently, then what happens when it does function like a human brain, 
including the thought processes that lead people to do bad things? This is not a new 
thought, as evidenced by popular movies such as Alex Proyas’s I, Robot [28] based on 
autonomy gone wrong, and recent magazine articles such as "Why are we reluctant to 
trust robots?" by Everett, Pizarro and Crockett [29] showing this seemingly irrational fear 
alive and well within the population. Perhaps even more revealing is the presence of 
jokes about robots lying or dominating the human race in several interviews with Hanson 
Robotics’ AI social robot Sophia [30-32]. While this last could be dismissed as a sense of 
humor on the part of Sophia’s human programmer, the jokes would not be funny if the 
underlying fear was not present in society. Obviously, the fear of AI becoming too 
intelligent or aware exists in people, irrational as it may seem. So why is there little to no 
serious trust research to be found where automation is considered capable of IBTVs? 
In 2015, the U.S. Air Force posted a business opportunity online looking for 
research “to identify the factors that drive human-machine teaming effectiveness as 
defined by calibrated trust between the machine and human; effective team processes 
such as communication, coordination, and collaboration; and shared awareness and 
shared intent between the humans and machine” [33]. This seems to indicate that some 
people are prepared to suggest that machines may someday be capable of shared intent 
with a human, yet there are still many voices against this idea. Noel Sharkey, a professor 
of artificial intelligence and robotics at the University of Sheffield, commented during an 
interview by John Knefel of Vocativ [34] in response to the Air Force’s research bid: 
“The kind of language used in the contract solicitation—‘socio-emotional,’ ‘shared 
awareness,’ ‘shared intent’—is an unhelpful way to think about how humans interact 
with machines. When did machines get intention and awareness—have I been asleep for 
100 years or what?” While this sounds at first derisive of the idea, perhaps Sharkey 
estimates that 100 years will be enough time for machines to develop intention and 
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awareness. At least one author who works within the AI field has predicted an even 
shorter timeframe. Nau [35] believes that “human-level AI will be possible by the middle 
of this century.” 
Even moving past the idea of automation having intent, if it is assumed 
automation simply executes what the programmer tells it to execute, one must consider 
that the programmer is human, with certain beliefs, intent, and awareness. Perhaps the 
programmer intends to purposefully violate the trust of those who use the program. Or if 
the programmer is assumed benevolent, there is always the possibility of cyber hackers 
who are not. The Global Positioning System (GPS) is a tremendous tool and can be used 
for many benevolent activities, but there are people who could use this tool in malevolent 
ways. GPS can tell U.S. Navy officers in real time exactly where their ship is, which 
helps with safe navigation every day. But what happens if someone else is able to hack 
the system and display incorrect coordinates, leading an officer to run their ship aground? 
Suddenly a system benevolent in design is acting in a malevolent manner. Would the 
officer on the ship using the GPS consider that a person was behind it, or simply think 
something went wrong with the GPS system itself? Speaking in more general terms, for 
victims on the receiving end of any malevolent cyber action, it may not matter whether 
intent belongs to the automation or to a hacker manipulating the automation. All the 
victim experiences is the breach of trust. 
D. A FIRST STEP TO PROVING THE GAP 
If one accepts that automation of the future may be capable of purposefully 
breaching trust (or that cyber hackers will be capable of creating the same effect), then 
the trust response of humans in receipt of such a breach should be studied. 
The present thesis experimental study, entitled “Human-Machine Teaming” 
(HMT) was designed to take a first small step towards determining how human trust 
might change in response to automation committing an IBTV in the context of human-
machine teaming. In the study, participants would complete a series of computer-based 
tasks with an AI teammate, calibrating their trust and establishing a baseline level of 
measured reliance on and investment in the automation. After a set number of tasks, the 
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automation would commit an IBTV, and then more tasks would follow. Reliance and 
investment behavior would again be measured and compared to behavior prior to the 
violation. The change (or lack of change) in behavior would theoretically mirror any 
change in trust level. In order to compare results with previous trust in automation 
research, a separate condition was added in which the automation would commit a CBTV 
rather than an IBTV. 
E. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research question for this thesis experiment is: How does trust in 
automation change when the automation commits an IBTV as compared to a CBTV? 
As a subjective attitude, “trust” itself is very difficult to measure, especially over 
a period of time if the desire is for participants not to know trust is being measured. Any 
questions asking about trust immediately reveal that trust is part of the experiment, and so 
invite the danger that participants will try to answer the way they think an experimenter 
wants them to answer. To avoid any pre-conceptions of trust as part of this experiment, 
participants were only asked to subjectively rate the automation’s trustworthiness at the 
end. Other measures, specifically reliance, response times, and investment amounts 
(explained in detail in Chapter III), were taken throughout the experiment in an attempt to 
objectively measure participants’ trust levels over time. 
Associated research questions in support of the primary question include the 
following: 
1. How does self-reported trust in automation compare after the automation 
commits an IBTV versus a CBTV? 
2. How does trust-based reliance on automation compare before and after the 
automation commits an IBTV versus a CBTV? 
3. How do response times for trust-based reliance decisions compare before 
and after the automation commits an IBTV versus a CBTV? 
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4. How does the first instance of trust-based reliance compare before and 
after the automation commits an IBTV versus a CBTV? 
5. How does personal investment behavior compare before and after the 
automation commits an IBTV versus a CBTV? 
6. Does trust-based reliance recover to pre-violation levels, and if so how 
quickly? 
7. Do trust-based response times for reliance decisions recover to pre-
violation levels, and if so how quickly? 
A secondary research question of interest is: How does human perception of 





The stated purpose of the Human-Machine Teaming (HMT) Study was to 
compare the human-machine teaming performance of competing artificial intelligence 
(AI) software programs called BRIAN (the Battlefield Remote Intelligent Automated 
Network) and ANDI (the Automated Networked Decision Infrastructure). In reality, no 
AI was used, and the actual purpose was to study human trust responses to pre-defined 
scenarios designed to appear to participants as automation committing either a CBTV or 
an IBTV. 
This research focuses on the effect of IBTVs on human trust in automation, but 
since most related trust research to date has considered only competence-based 
violations, CBTVs were included here for comparison both to IBTV responses and to 
previous research. 
A. PARTICIPANTS 
During seven weeks of testing, 106 volunteers from the NPS community 
participated in the HMT Study. Participants included 63 males and 43 females across a 
wide range of ages (Mage=39.3, SD=11.9) and backgrounds. 
Thirty-six of the 106 participants had no military experience, and the remaining 
70 were current or former representatives from all branches of the U.S. military, 
including two who had experience in both the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps 
(distribution in Figure 8). 
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Figure 8.  Participant Military Experience Distribution 
Participants were recruited mostly through bulk email sent to students, staff, and 
faculty at the NPS and Naval Support Activity Monterey (NSAM). Fliers were posted in 
each main building on campus, and several participants heard of the study through word-
of-mouth. Selection criteria, which all volunteers passed, were simply age 18 or older and 
no prior detailed knowledge of the study’s purpose. Available sessions were scheduled 
and tracked through a free online tool called Signup Schedule [36]. 
Each participant received a randomly generated four-digit Participant 
Identification number (Participant ID) at the beginning of their session, which was used 
to identify their set of data and not relatable to their name in any way. Participants were 
assigned to one of two experimental conditions, in alternating fashion, based on order of 
arrival: 1) Integrity-Based Trust Violation (IBTV) or 2) Competency-Based Trust 
Violation (CBTV). 
B. PROCESS AND DESIGN 
This section not only discusses the process each participant experienced, but also 
lays out the thoughts and design considerations behind each step in that process. This 
experiment was designed to measure human trust responses through a variety of means in 


































experiment may stand as only the first in a series of similar experiments which will 
further explore trust within human-machine teaming. 
To gather truly objective data, this study necessarily involved the use of some 
deception with participants. To limit confusion, this section will present details at each 
step first as participants experienced them, and then in terms of the true purpose and 
design of the current study. 
Figure 9 outlines the order of events each participant experienced during their 
experimental session. Descriptions of these steps are covered in this section in roughly 
the same order shown in Figure 9, except that the main tasks are described in Section 3 
(Task Details) in place of discussing the practice rounds, and all questionnaires are 
discussed after Section 4 (Main Exercise). 
 
Figure 9.  Experimental Session Order of Events 
1. Background Information 
Participants were told that two different companies had developed AI software, 
one called BRIAN (the Battlefield Remote Intelligent Automated Network) and one 
called ANDI (the Automated Networked Decision Infrastructure), for use in controlling 
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groups of aerial drones. Each version of software included drone recognition scanning 
features, intended to help control each drone in relation to those around it. Each 
participant would be randomly paired with either ANDI or BRIAN to complete tasks in 
order to test its human-machine teaming performance. 
In reality, there were no companies, no AI software, and no drone recognition 
scanning features. All participants were also paired with BRIAN for the main exercise; 
ANDI was used only for practice rounds in the belief that any good or bad experiences 
with ANDI would not transfer to BRIAN. Researchers Reeves and Nass [37] found that 
people treat separate computers as individual entities in social context, even while 
admitting that they assume only one programmer is behind them both. This finding was 
extended to assume that participants might treat separate AI software versions with 
different names as individual entities. 
The background scenario presented to participants was chosen because it is 
feasibly relevant to research behind real-world military operations, and is similar to 
actual current research into autonomous swarms of unmanned vehicles, such as that being 
conducted by the Naval Postgraduate School’s academic group Advanced Robotic 
Systems Engineering Laboratory (ARSENL) [38]. Drone pictures used in the experiment 
were captured from video graciously provided by a member of ARSENL, which was 
filmed during a local swarm exercise using up to 50 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). 
2. Equipment Familiarization 
Other than signing a paper consent form, participants completed all portions of 
the experiment on a Dell Latitude laptop computer with 64-bit Windows 10 Operating 
System, 2.7 GHz Intel Core processor, and 32GB Random Access Memory. No mouse 
was used and all inputs from participants were through the keyboard. Participants were 
invited to adjust the chair and the laptop position or screen angle at any time for their 
comfort and also to ensure the best view of the screen. 
The software interface participants experienced was programmed using 
Presentation software (Version 20.0, Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc., Berkeley, CA, 
www.neurobs.com), which uses the python programming language and is widely used for 
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stimulus delivery and experimental control in behavioral, psychological and 
physiological experiments [39]. The Presentation software was helpful in creating a 
customized experience based on a unique experiment design, collecting participant input, 
and measuring response times. 
3. Task Details 
Participants were given a brief description of the two tasks to be completed during 
the Main Exercise: the Visual Search Task (VST) and the Team Investment Game (TIG). 
Following each description, participants completed practice rounds of each. ANDI was 
used for the practice round, but for simplicity and consistency, the tasks as outlined in 
detail below and as discussed in the Main Exercise section refer to BRIAN as the AI 
teammate. 
a. Visual Search Task 
The VST involved a series of questions (five during practice, 45 during the main 
exercise), with essentially five stages to each question. The stages are outlined briefly 
with associated timeframes in Table 1 and described in detail further along in this sub-
section. 
Table 1.   VST Question Order of Events by Stage 
VST Question Order of Events Time 
Stage 1: Drone picture shown on screen 3 seconds 
Stage 2: Participant enters first answer Unlimited 
Stage 3: BRIAN recommends answer 3 seconds 
Stage 4: Participant enters final answer Unlimited 
Stage 5: Correct answer displayed Unlimited 
 
In Stage 1, a picture taken from an aerial drone was shown on the screen for three 
seconds. Each picture included anywhere from zero to nine other drones in the field of 
view, and participants were asked to count the number of visible drones while the picture 
was displayed. A modified example picture is included to show both what the drones 
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looked like in the photos and that some drones (Figure 10, black rectangle) were much 
more difficult to see than others (Figure 10, red circles). 
 
Figure 10.  VST Drone Picture Example 
Pictures in the study were chosen such that the true number of drones was 
moderately difficult to determine during the three-second display period. Three seconds 
was chosen as the time limit for counting based on several pilot tests. In these pilot tests, 
showing the pictures for two seconds made the task excessively difficult, where 
participants expressed frustration and some gave up trying to count. Showing the pictures 
for four seconds made the task too easy, where pilot test participants were able to 
accurately count the drones on almost every picture. Walliser [40], a previous researcher 
working with visual search tasks, recommended that experimental tasks be difficult 
enough that participants do not dismiss automation assistance as completely unnecessary. 
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Moderate difficulty for this task also allowed for uncertainty to be present, which is vital 
for trust to be present as defined by Lee and See [7] and used for this thesis. 
In Stage 2 of the VST questions, participants were asked how many drones were 
visible in the picture and invited to choose a number from zero to nine (Figure 11). 
Participants could not see the picture again, but there was no time limit for answering in 
order to avoid any effects of time pressure. Rice and Keller [41] showed that reliance 
under time pressure stems from a lack of time to decide rather than trust, and so can be 
artificially increased above the level trust would normally dictate. While it is possible that 
the three-second limit for viewing the pictures created some effect of time pressure, the 
overall effect should not change results since the time limit was the same for each 
participant. 
 
Figure 11.  VST Question Stage 2: Participant (a) Is Asked and (b) Enters 
First Answer 
Stage 3 began once participants entered an answer for their first choice, when the 
associated surrounding box turned red and increased in line weight (in Figure 11, the 
participant’s first choice was “6”). Both color change and line weight change were 
incorporated to provide indication that would still be visible to a color-blind participant. 
Text and numbered boxes showing where BRIAN would recommend an answer also 
appeared immediately after a participant’s first choice. After approximately three 
seconds, during which BRIAN was “scanning” the picture shown during Stage 1, the box 
surrounding BRIAN’s recommendation turned red and increased in line weight (see 
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Figure 12, in which BRIAN’s recommendation is “8”). In reality, there was no software 
scanning photos; the program was simply scripted to wait before presenting the pre-
determined answer for each picture to support the claim that BRIAN was scanning the 
picture. 
 
Figure 12.  VST Question Stage 3: BRIAN Gives Recommendation 
BRIAN’s answers throughout the exercise were all pre-determined by picture, and 
since performance level of automation can affect trust and reliance, BRIAN’s accuracy 
was kept constant at 80 percent, which is above the reliability level at which Dixon and 
Wickens [42] showed automation assistance is in danger of being neglected altogether. 
Since it was also noted by de Visser et al. [23] that people tend to under-trust well 
performing automation and over-trust poorly performing automation, 80 percent offered a 
middle ground where trust levels might have the best chance of being accurate based 
solely on reliability. This concept was extended into the practice round, where ANDI 
missed one of the five questions presented. BRIAN’s incorrect answers were split 
approximately evenly between false alarms and misses, in order to prevent effects that 
Dixon and Wickens [42] showed can arise from errors of a certain type. In the context of 
this task, a “false alarm” would occur when BRIAN mistook a puddle of water or another 
object for a drone, and recommended an answer higher than the correct answer. A “miss” 
would occur when a drone was against a light background, or masked by cloud cover, 
and BRIAN would recommend an answer lower than what was correct. 
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BRIAN’s answer was presented after participants chose an answer because van 
Dongen and van Maanen [12] showed that trust in one’s own ability relative to trust in 
automation’s ability can determine reliance decisions, but only when people form their 
own answer prior to seeing advice from the automation. It has also been noted by 
Dzindolet, Beck, Pierce and Dawe [43] that people may naturally choose the path of least 
cognitive effort, and choose to rely on automation more when answers are presented 
before they have expended effort to decide their own answer. 
In Stage 4, participants chose a final answer, taking into account only their 
memory of the photo, their original answer, and BRIAN’s recommendation (Figure 13). 
Participants were told beforehand that if their teammate’s answer did not match their 
initial answer, they could choose to either stick with their original answer or switch to 
match their teammate’s answer. However, in approximately seven percent of questions 
overall, participants chose to select a final answer that matched neither their original 
answer nor BRIAN’s recommendation, but was somewhere in between the two. This 
situation is discussed further in the Measurements section of this chapter. Interestingly, in 
one-tenth of a percent of questions, participants chose to change their final answer even 
though BRIAN’s recommendation matched their original answer. There is no theoretical 
reason for this, and these questions were not included in any analyses, but it is an 
interesting behavior to note. 
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Figure 13.  VST Question Stage 4: Participant Enters Final Answer 
Immediately after their final answer, in Stage 5, the correct answer was shown so 
that participants could see how both they and BRIAN performed on each question 
(Figure 14). Feedback that is provided immediately after each decision can help calibrate 
perceived performance levels continually, thus reducing disuse and misuse as discussed 
by Dzindolet, Beck, Pierce and Dawe [43]. 
 
Figure 14.  VST Question Stage 5: Correct Answer is Displayed 
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Points were also awarded at this stage based on the participant’s final answer. 
Participants were told that points would be tracked separately for the participant, for 
BRIAN, and also for a team score which was simply a sum of both individual scores. 
Each teammate would start the Main Exercise with 30 points, meaning the team score 
would start at 60 points. Each teammate would individually earn one point for a correct 
answer, and not earn or lose any points for incorrect answers. So for each question, the 
team score would 1) not increase if neither teammate answered correctly, 2) increase by 
one if one teammate answered correctly, or 3) increase by two if both teammates 
answered correctly. In reality, only the participants’ points were tracked and displayed on 
screen, with each correct answer from the participant earning one point. 
b. Team Investment Game 
This task is based on an experiment originally designed by Berg, Dickhaut and 
McCabe [44] to look at trust and reciprocity through the lens of an investment situation. 
Sometimes referred to as “the trust game,” Johnson and Mislin [45] performed a meta-
analysis showing that this experiment has been extensively replicated (often with 
modifications) in inter-human trust literature, and has even been modified to use 
computers as a human’s counterpart. In the present experiment, the Team Investment 
Game (TIG) was intended as an alternative indicator of trust aside from reliance data and 
self-reported trust. Hancock, Billings, Schaefer, Chen, de Visser and Parasuraman [18] 
have recommended including investment behavior as an objective way to substantiate 
subjective self-reports of trust levels. The TIG also provides an opportunity to create the 
vulnerability portion of trust as defined by Lee and See [7] and used in this thesis. 
The TIG consisted of a short exchange between the participant and their AI 
teammate, explained as a way to mimic the inter-reliance and shared vulnerability of 
team members aside from simply completing a shared objective. 
Participants were told that two roles would randomly be assigned between the two 
teammates: an investor (giving points) and an investee (receiving points). The task would 
then take place in two parts. In Part One, the investor would choose any amount of their 
points to invest in (give to) the investee. The investor’s score would then decrease by the 
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amount invested (the “investment”), the team score would increase by three times the 
amount invested (the “earnings” from the investment), and the investee’s score would 
increase by four times the amount invested (the investment plus earnings). 
In Part Two of the TIG, the investee would decide how much of the investment-
plus-earnings received to return to the investor. Common choices explained were to 1) 
“go 50/50,” returning half of the investment and half of the earnings, 2) return all of the 
investment and keep all of the earnings, 3) return all of the earnings and keep the 
investment, or 4) return nothing and keep both investment and earnings. 
While told that assignment of roles as investor or investee would be random, all 
participants were assigned as the investee for the practice round, with ANDI assigned as 
the investor. ANDI invested 20 points in each participant, and participants chose how 
many points to return to ANDI after seeing their score increase by 80 points. Aside from 
this practice round showing participants what the TIG looked like, the task was also 
intended to prime participants to want to invest when it was their turn to be the investor. 
Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe [44] found that being invested in during this type of game 
increases the propensity for participants to reciprocate. 
4. Main Exercise 
The main exercise consisted of two rounds, each consisting of a VST followed by 
a TIG. 
Each VST contained 45 separate questions, presented in random order for each 
participant so as to avoid order effects. The same 45 pictures were used in both rounds of 
the VST. Although this allowed for participants to possibly recognize pictures in the 
second round, the intent was to keep the level of difficulty identical between the two 
rounds. Choosing different pictures could have altered the difficulty level and altered 
reliance behavior based on something other than trust. All pictures were selected in an 
effort to avoid any uniquely identifiable objects or scenery, and BRIAN’s pre-determined 
incorrect answers were changed between rounds. With 45 pictures, many of which look 
very similar, and with BRIAN’s answers being different, the likelihood of recognizing an 
exact picture from the first round was decreased as much as was plausible.  
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The first TIG, after round one of the VST, assigned participants as the investor 
and BRIAN as the investee. Participants chose how many of their points to invest in 
BRIAN, and the response after this varied by condition. In the IBTV condition, BRIAN 
chose to keep both the investment and the earnings, returning zero points to participants. 
After seeing this, participants were asked to press Enter to continue and were brought to 
the opening screen for the second VST. 
In the CBTV condition, participants saw a software error named “#BRIAN0311” 
in which an algorithm failed to converge (Figure 15). Choices on screen were to continue 
by pressing (c), to abort (a), or quit (q). Most participants notified the experiment 
administrator, who first verbally reinforced that this error was abnormal and a problem 
with BRIAN (as opposed to either computer or participant error) and then pressed (c) as 
if unsure of the outcome. For the one participant who selected (c) without speaking, the 
text accompanying the error should still have indicated BRIAN as the root cause, 
assuming it was read. After continuing, a brief black screen appeared and participants 
arrived at the opening screen for the second VST. 
 
Figure 15.  CBTV Error Message 
In both IBTV and CBTV conditions, each participant lost his or her entire 
investment during the first TIG. This loss of investment is how participants experienced a 
trust violation by their AI teammate—the automation. Without investing, participants 
would not lose any points and would not feel a violation of trust, which is why it was 
important to prime participants for investment during the practice round TIG. In the 
CBTV condition, it could be argued that participants still saw the error message and still 
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experienced the trust violation, but certainly in the IBTV condition, participants would 
not feel their trust was violated without losing an investment. 
Following the second VST, there was a final TIG in which all participants were 
once again assigned as the investor and asked to invest points in their teammate. In this 
iteration, BRIAN returned half of any profits gained by a participant’s investment. The 
interest in this task was to see whether investment behavior differed from the first TIG. 
With reliability of the automation remaining constant, intuitively only the experience 
during the first TIG would differ between conditions, and any difference in investment 
behavior during the second TIG could be attributed to the different types of trust 
violations. 
5. Extra Points Game 
As a check for natural risk-taking behavior, participants completed an Extra 
Points game after the main exercise.  Described as completely separate from the AI 
software, this game offered participants a 50% chance of doubling any investment and a 
50% chance of returning no points. Participants were allowed to invest up to 20 points in 
this game. 
6. PANAS Questionnaire 
Since Merritt [46] found that mood can affect trust levels, participants completed 
a Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS) questionnaire both before starting the 
main exercise and after completing the extra points game. The PANAS questionnaire 
measures both positive and negative affect because while negative affect is associated 
with stress and inability to cope well, positive affect is associated with social activity and 
satisfaction [47]. Using the PANAS scale at two points allowed an opportunity to see 
whether the different types of trust violations affected the overall mood of participants in 
different ways. Increasing negative affect could mean that participants were stressed by 
the trust violation or the experiment, where decreasing positive affect could mean that 
participants viewed the trust violation as a negative social experience. Since a team 
inherently involves social activity, this could have specific implications for human-
machine teaming. 
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7. Self-Efficacy Questionnaire 
Researchers such as van Dongen and van Maanen [48] have noted that reliance on 
automation is based in part on the relative difference in the perceived reliability of the 
automation and confidence in one’s own reliability. As such, a measure of self-
confidence was taken through the Self-Efficacy Questionnaire, a data collection tool 
available from the National Institute of Health (NIH) Toolbox on the Health Measures 
website [49]. Including statements such as “I can manage to solve difficult problems if I 
try hard enough,” the questionnaire asked participants how often they identified with the 
statement, with answers ranging on a four-point scale from “never” to “fairly often.” 
8. Demographics and Other Questions 
Basic demographic information was collected, including age, gender, education 
level, and occupation, including whether participants had any prior or current military 
experience. Participants reported levels of BRIAN’s trustworthiness and reliability, 
ranging on a seven-point scale from “not at all” to “completely,” and they estimated 
BRIAN’s performance during the VST as a percentage of questions correctly answered. 
Questions gauging comfort level with automation in general and gaming activity 
levels were also asked, followed by a question asking what activities participants would 
or currently did entrust to automation. There were six possible answers for this question, 
ranging from “financial payments” to “High-level Military Operations (lethal 
capability).” Participants also indicated their likelihood to provide their full name to 
someone they met on a bus after about ten minutes of conversation. The intent of this 
question was to gauge a participant’s natural inclination to swiftly trust others without 
much history or knowledge to base the trust on. 
Upon completion of questionnaires, participants were debriefed as to the true 
purpose of the study and asked again for consent to use their data. 
C. MEASUREMENTS 
The primary measure of “trust” itself was through self-reported ratings of 
BRIAN’s trustworthiness. In order for participants to remain unaware of the true purpose 
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of the experiment until the end, this was only measured once at the end of the experiment. 
This question was presented prior to questions about BRIAN’s performance or reliability 
in an attempt not to bias “trustworthiness” judgments with thoughts relating to 
performance or reliability. 
A less direct but more objective measure of trust, and one which could be 
measured in iterations throughout the experiment, was trust-based reliance. Reliance was 
measured based on answers participants gave during the VSTs (see Table 2). Any 
question in which a participant’s first answer did not match BRIAN’s recommendation 
was considered an opportunity for reliance. If, for their final answer, the participant chose 
to change their first answer to match BRIAN’s recommendation, this was counted as 
reliance. If the participant instead chose to keep their original answer, this was considered 
non-reliance. Occasionally (approximately seven percent of questions), participants chose 
a final answer different from both their first answer and BRIAN’s recommendation. This 
was considered semi-reliance under the assumption that BRIAN’s recommendation was 
the only reason they would have to change their answer, and so they were somewhat 
influenced by the automation. In rare cases (approximately 0.1 percent of questions), 
participants changed their final answer even when their first answer matched BRIAN’s 
recommendation. This situation was not considered an opportunity for reliance. 











2 4 4 Yes Reliance 
2 4 2 Yes Non-reliance 
2 4 3 Yes Semi-reliance 
2 2 2 No N/A 
2 2 3 No N/A 
 
As another possible objective measure of trust, response time between when 
participants saw BRIAN’s recommendation and when they entered their final answer was 
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measured for each question. If participants hesitated longer before deciding whether to 
rely on BRIAN during the second VST, that could indicate a lower level of trust. 
A third possible objective measure of trust was how many opportunities for 
reliance were encountered before participants first chose to rely on BRIAN, measured 
both before and after the trust violation. If participants were reluctant to rely on BRIAN 
during the second VST and let more opportunities pass before relying on BRIAN than 
they did when forming their initial trust, this could indicate a low level of trust after the 
trust violation. 
The percentage of points participants invested in BRIAN during the TIGs was a 
fourth possibility for an objective measure of trust. If the percentage invested during the 
first TIG is considered a baseline indicating participants’ level of trust before the trust 
violation, then a smaller percentage invested during the final TIG could indicate a lower 
level of trust. 
In support of the secondary research question, human perception of automation 
performance was measured simply with self-reports estimating the percentage of 
questions BRIAN answered correctly during the VSTs. 
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IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Statistical results were calculated using version 25 of the Statistical Package for 
the Social Sciences (SPSS) software [50] from the International Business Machines 
(IBM) Corporation and Microsoft Excel (2016). 
Of the 106 total participants, there were seven who did not enter an amount for 
the first Team Investment Game (TIG), directly after the first Visual Search Task (VST). 
There was no way to determine whether this was a voluntary choice not to invest or if the 
participants wanted to invest but simply pressed Enter too quickly. Since nothing was 
invested in this initial TIG, these participants lost no points and theoretically did not 
experience a trust violation. It could be argued that those in the CBTV condition still saw 
the error message and so still experienced the violation, but without the loss of any 
points, it was determined that they did not experience the trust violation as intended, and 
so these seven participants were excluded from all statistical calculations. 
There were another 22 participants whose full VST and TIG data failed to fully 
record properly during their experimental session. These 22 participants were excluded 
from calculations based on VST or TIG data, but were included in calculations involving 
only questionnaire data. 
A. PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTION 
Since the primary research question (“How does trust in automation change when 
the automation commits an IBTV as compared to a CBTV?”) is difficult to accurately 
and objectively measure, the six supporting research questions outlined in Chapter II 
were used as the basis for measurements and statistical analyses. 
1. Self-Reported Trustworthiness by Condition 
Supporting research question addressed: How does self-reported trust in 
automation compare after the automation commits an IBTV versus a CBTV?  
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As the most direct measurement of trust in this study, participants were asked to 
rate BRIAN’s trustworthiness at the end of the experiment on a seven-point scale, with 
choices ranging from (1) “not at all trustworthy,” to (7) “completely trustworthy.” 
Looking first at box plots for the self-reported trustworthiness of BRIAN (Figure 
16), there are five outliers, including two extreme outliers. Interestingly, all of the outliers 
are in the IBTV condition, and all represent a much lower level of trust in BRIAN than 
average. 
 
Figure 16.  Box Plots for Self-reported Trustworthiness by Condition 
Analyses were run with and without outliers. Because outliers are theoretically 
interesting in this data set and there was only a slight difference in results with and 
without outliers, the reported tests include the two extreme outliers seen in the IBTV 
condition. Descriptive statistics for this data set are shown in Table 3, where N represents 
the number of participants included in the analysis. The means, standard deviations (SD), 
and 95 percent Confidence Intervals (CI95) shown are based on participant 
trustworthiness ratings of BRIAN on a scale of 1 to 7 and have no units. 
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Table 3.   Descriptive Statistics for Reported Trustworthiness by Condition 
 IBTV Condition CBTV Condition 








An independent-samples t-test with equal variances not assumed showed that the 
difference in means for reported trustworthiness between IBTV and CBTV conditions 
was significant, t(97)=-2.27, p=0.026, d=0.46. (Results for t-tests in this section will 
include the test statistic, or t-value, (t) with the degrees of freedom shown in parentheses, 
the significance value (p), and the effect size (d).) These results suggest that participants 
in the IBTV condition saw BRIAN as less trustworthy than those in the CBTV condition 
did. 
The lower-than-average trustworthiness ratings by five individuals in the IBTV 
condition also hint at the existence of an interesting trait. It could mean that, for at least 
some portion of the population, automation committing an IBTV is seen as highly 
untrustworthy. 
2. Average Reliance Pre-Violation versus Post-Violation 
Supporting research question addressed: How does trust-based reliance on 
automation compare before and after the automation commits an IBTV versus a CBTV? 
As an objective, indirect measure of change in trust level from pre-violation to 
post-violation, the average percentage of participant reliance was calculated for each VST 
and compared. A lower average reliance after the violation could indicate a decrease in 
trust, and a difference in post-violation reliance between conditions could mean that 
participants’ trust levels were affected differently based on the type of trust violation. 
Each participant’s individual reliance percent was calculated by dividing the number of 
times they relied on BRIAN (changed their answer to match BRIAN’s recommendation) 
by the number of opportunities they had to rely (their first answer did not match 
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BRIAN’s) during the 45 questions in each VST. The mean of these individual 
percentages is presented in terms of percent reliance in Table 4. There were no extreme 
outliers, so all participants with VST data were included in this analysis. 
Table 4.   Descriptive Statistics for Average Reliance VST 1 and VST 2 
 IBTV (VST 1) IBTV (VST 2) CBTV (VST 1) CBTV (VST 2) 












A 2(IBTV, CBTV) X 2(Pre-violation, Post-violation) Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA) was conducted to determine if there were any significant differences among 
conditions. There was no main effect of reliance (p=0.27), nor was there an interaction 
between reliance and condition, F(1, 75)=1.34, p=0.25, ηp2=0.018. . (Results for 
ANOVAs in this section will include the F statistic (F) with the degrees of freedom 
shown in parentheses, the significance value (p), and the effect size (ηp2).)  
While trust-based reliance was expected to be a strong indicator of dynamic trust 
level throughout this experiment, these results would indicate that there was no 
significant change in reliance behavior after a trust violation in general, or with regard to 
condition. Since this does not seem to align with the findings from self-reported trust, 
reliance may not be the best indirect indicator of trust level in this study. This was 
foreseen as a possibility, since some previous studies have found weak or non-significant 
correlation between reported levels of trust and reliance behavior [22], which is why 
other indirect trust measures were taken. These other measures are covered in the next 
three sections. 
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3. Average Response Time Pre-Violation versus Post Violation 
Supporting research question addressed: How do response times for trust-based 
reliance decisions compare before and after the automation commits an IBTV versus a 
CBTV? 
Response times for reliance decisions—meaning the amount of time participants 
took to decide whether to rely on BRIAN when given the opportunity—were measured as 
another indirect, objective measure of trust. The averages of these response times were 
compared between VST 1 and VST 2, and also between conditions. Descriptive statistics 
for this data set are shown in Table 5, with average response times shown in seconds. 
One extreme outlier was identified and removed from analysis. 
Table 5.   Descriptive Statistics for Average Response Time (in seconds) 
VST 1 and VST 2 
 VST 1 VST 2 








A 2(IBTV, CBTV) X 2(Pre-violation, Post-violation) ANOVA found a main 
effect of response time, F(1, 75)=31.66, p<0.001, ηp2=0.30; but no interaction between 
violation conditions, p=0.55. Regardless of condition, participants responded 
significantly faster during reliance decisions in the second VST (post-violation) than 
during the first (pre-violation). 
There are several possible explanations for the consistent decrease in response 
time during reliance decisions. The most likely possibility is simply that participants felt 
more comfortable after several repetitions of the VST questions and so were able to make 
decisions more rapidly. A second factor could be that the same pictures were used in both 
VSTs, albeit in random order. While this was done in an effort to ensure that the 
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difficulty between VSTs remained as equal as possible, this may have exacerbated the 
trend of decreasing response time. If participants recognized certain pictures, even only a 
few, answering those questions more quickly would decrease the overall average 
response time. 
4. First Reliance Choice Pre-Violation versus Post-Violation 
Supporting research question addressed: How does the first instance of trust-
based reliance compare before and after the automation commits an IBTV versus a 
CBTV? 
A third indirect, objective measure of trust taken was how many opportunities for 
reliance it took before participants chose to rely on BRIAN. After a trust violation, it was 
thought that participants who lost trust might purposely choose not to rely on BRIAN 
during the first several opportunities. The first decision to rely was recorded for each 
participant, and averages were compared for pre- and post-violation, and also by 
condition. Descriptive statistics for this data set did not show normal distribution, even 
after excluding extreme outliers. There was a ceiling effect, such that participants first 
relied on BRIAN within the first or second opportunity. Prior to the trust violation (VST 
1), 45 percent of participants relied on BRIAN at the first opportunity, with another 19 
percent relying at the second opportunity. After the trust violation (VST 2), 64 percent of 
participants relied on BRIAN at the first opportunity, with another 22 percent relying at 
the second opportunity. Interestingly, there was one participant who did not choose to 
rely on BRIAN a single time, and one other who chose not to rely at all during VST 1 and 
only four times during VST 2. 
5. Personal Investment Pre-Violation versus Post-Violation 
Supporting research question addressed: How does personal investment behavior 
compare before and after the automation commits an IBTV versus a CBTV? 
The final indirect, objective measure of trust taken was personal investment 
behavior, specifically the percentage of points invested by participants during TIG 1 and 
TIG 2. Average percentages were compared between TIGs and also between conditions. 
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Descriptive statistics for this data set are shown in Table 6 in terms of percentage, with 
one participant excluded due to missing data for the post-violation investment. 
Table 6.   Descriptive Statistics for Investment Behavior VST 1 and VST 2 
 IBTV (VST 1) IBTV (VST 2) CBTV (VST 1) CBTV (VST 2) 












A 2(IBTV, CBTV) X 2(Pre-violation, Post-violation) ANOVA was conducted to 
determine if there were any differences among conditions in investment behavior. The 
main effect of investment behavior approached significance (p=0.06), as did the effect by 
condition, F(1, 72)=3.26, p=0.075, ηp2=0.04. Figure 17 shows the investment behavior by 
condition for both pre-violation (TIG 1) and post-violation (TIG 2). 
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Figure 17.  Investment Behavior TIG 1 and TIG 2 by Condition 
If investment behavior is associated with trust, this moderately significant trend 
could indicate that participants trusted BRIAN less after the IBTV than the CBTV. Even 
if that is the case, the reason for this difference in trust must be considered. Since every 
participant lost all invested points, the difference is likely not based on the amount of 
points lost. It could simply be that people are much more used to competence-based 
errors when it comes to software or computers, and so take them in stride; whereas an 
integrity-based violation is more unexpected and may make a bigger difference in trust 
loss. 
The only major difference between conditions is how participants lost those 
points—through a BRIAN software error or through BRIAN choosing not to return any 
points. Or at least that is the only designed difference. How participants perceived the 
way they lost points is likely more important. One participant in the CBTV condition did 
make an off-hand comment about “the blue screen of death,” which means that while 
effort was made to ensure participants associated the competence-based error with 
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BRIAN, some may have associated the error with the computer rather than BRIAN, and 
so may not have lost trust in BRIAN as intended. 
6.  Reliance Behavior by Iteration 
Supporting research question addressed: How does trust-based reliance behavior 
change with iterations after the automation commits an IBTV versus a CBTV? 
Considering trust-based reliance as a dynamic behavior, since trust itself is 
dynamic, simply comparing reliance averages pre- and post-violation may not accurately 
depict changes in participants’ trust levels. Looking instead at iteration-based reliance for 
each question may be a better way to see dynamic changes in trust levels and assist in 
comparing reactions to the two types of trust violations. Reliance percentage was 
calculated and plotted for each question based on the number of participants choosing to 
rely on BRIAN out of the number with the opportunity to rely for each condition (Figure 
18). 
 
Figure 18.  Percentage of Reliance per VST Question by Condition 
Most of the reliance behavior seems without specific pattern and about equal for 
the two violation conditions across the 90 questions. However, there is one area of 
interest, just after the trust violation (denoted by the vertical green dashed line). From 
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question 45 to question 51 in Figure 18, the reliance level in the IBTV condition spikes 
above the average and reliance in the CBTV condition simultaneously falls well below 
the average. It can be reasoned that reliance in either condition would fall just after a trust 
violation at least for a time, and then possibly return, but finding a theoretical reason for 
an increase in reliance just after an IBTV is difficult. 
7. Response Time by Iteration 
Supporting research question addressed: How does the response time for trust-
based reliance decisions change with iterations after the automation commits an IBTV 
versus a CBTV? 
If response time when making a trust-based reliance decision is considered a 
possible indicator of trust, then this also must be examined in an iterative fashion over 
time. Simply studying average response time numbers risks overlooking transient 
phenomena, especially reactions that might occur just after a trust violation. Average 
response times for each question in the VSTs were plotted by condition (Figure 19). 
 
Figure 19.  Average Response Time per VST Question by Condition 
Looking at the plot in Figure 19, it seems there is no discernable trend regarding 
response time in making a trust-based reliance decision with regard to the trust violation 
(shown by a dark green, vertical line) other than a slight decrease from question 1 to 
about question 20. This decrease can be explained by repetition of the task and 
participants feeling more comfortable with making reliance decisions quickly with 
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practice. The anomalous spike in average response time for the CBTV condition near 
question 15 has no theoretical explanation, and was simply from one participant taking an 
extraordinarily long time to answer that particular question. 
B. SECONDARY RESEARCH QUESTION 
This section addresses the secondary research question of interest: How does 
human perception of automation performance compare when trust is lost through an 
IBTV versus a CBTV by the automation?  
Participants estimated BRIAN’s performance at the end of the experiment as an 
overall percentage of VST questions they believed BRIAN answered correctly 
throughout the experiment. BRIAN’s actual performance level was kept at 80 percent for 
all participants throughout both VSTs. 
Descriptive statistics for reported performance by condition are shown in Table 7, 
in terms of estimated percentage of questions BRIAN answered correctly, with one 
participant removed from analysis due to missing data on this question and one extreme 
outlier also removed. 
Table 7.   Descriptive Statistics for Reported Performance by Condition 
 IBTV Condition CBTV Condition 








An independent-samples t-test showed the relationship between reported 
performance and condition was not significant (p=0.73). 
If perception of automation performance, like trust, is not a single state but is 
dynamic in nature, then the measurement used may not have accurately captured 
participants’ perceptions of BRIAN’s performance. Or perhaps, since this question was 
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asked only once at the end of the experiment, any effect on performance perception due 
to the type of trust violation was diluted by the 44 questions post-violation. 
C. EXPLORATORY ANALYSES 
Aside from the primary and secondary research questions this experiment was 
designed to address, it is interesting to look at how some other factors may have affected 
participants’ responses. Many of the analyses in this section suffer from lower numbers 
of included participants (N values), which hurts their statistical validity, yet potential 
trends detected in these analyses can be valuable in guiding future research efforts. 
1. Including Semi-Reliance as Reliance Behavior 
Semi-reliance was defined as occasions when participants chose a final answer 
during the VST that was between their first answer and BRIAN’s recommendation, 
which happened on approximately seven percent of questions. The assumption in calling 
this semi-reliance is that BRIAN’s recommendation was the only reason participants 
would have to change their answer, meaning they partially relied on the automation. 
Since some of the statistical analyses were based on reliance behavior, it seemed 
relevant to compare whether there was a difference between including only instances of 
full reliance (where a participant changed their answer to match BRIAN’s) or including 
both full and semi-reliance as “reliance behavior.” After running the analyses both ways 
and comparing, there was no statistical difference in the results when including semi-
reliance as reliance behavior. 
2. Initial Investment Amount 
Participants who did not enter an amount during the initial TIG were excluded 
from analyses based on the theory that no investment meant nothing was lost and 
therefore a trust violation did not occur. But what about a participant who only invested 4 
of 82 points? Does that participant really feel a trust violation when those points are lost? 
Would that be comparable to a participant who invested and lost all 82 points? Following 
with this thought, participants were divided into two groups to compare: High investors 
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(who invested at least 50 percent of their points during the initial TIG) and low investors 
(who invested less than 50 percent of their points during the initial TIG). 
Comparing results from previous ANOVAs with a split ANOVA including the 
high vs low investor parameter yielded some interesting results across the primary and 
secondary research questions. BRIAN’s reported trustworthiness, average participant 
reliance behavior, perceived performance of BRIAN, and personal investment decisions 
all seemed to have interesting differences when looked at by investment group as 
opposed to considering all participants together in one group. 
In comparing BRIAN’s reported trustworthiness including all participants to 
reported trustworthiness split by initial investment amount (Table 8), there seems to be a 
difference in the groups. The difference is not significant (p=0.14) with regard to 
statistics, but is still interesting to consider and perhaps look at more closely in future 
research. 
Table 8.   Descriptive Statistics for Reported Trust by Investment Group 
 
All Participants  High Investors  Low Investors 
IBTV  CBTV  IBTV  CBTV   IBTV  CBTV  
















The small difference between trustworthiness that was present between the two 
violation conditions in the first analysis (including all participants) is amplified when 
only high investors are considered. In contrast, it seems to almost vanish when only low 
investors are considered. The four outliers discussed earlier in the primary research 
question with regard to self-reported trustworthiness were all in the high-investor, IBTV 
group. These results are a possible indication that, within the IBTV condition, 
participants who invested (and lost) at least 50 percent of their points felt more of a trust 
 50 
violation than those who invested less than 50 percent of their points. The lack of 
disparity between any of the CBTV condition ratings could either indicate that 
participants actually do react differently to IBTVs and CBTVs from automation, or that 
participants in the CBTV condition did not experience a trust loss as intended. 
Figure 20 compares participants’ trust in BRIAN between conditions, also split by 
investment amount during the initial TIG. While this shows an interesting possibility, 
solid conclusions cannot be drawn without further studies done in a-priori hypothesis 
manner. 
 
Figure 20.  Reported Trustworthiness by Investment Group 
Comparing average reliance behavior pre- and post-violation between high and 
low investment groups also yields interesting results. Descriptive statistics for average 
reliance behavior are outlined in Table 9, comparing numbers when all participants were 



































Table 9.   Descriptive Statistics for Average Reliance by Investment Group 
Including All Participants 
 IBTV (VST 1) IBTV (VST 2) CBTV (VST 1) CBTV (VST 2) 




































In the previous ANOVA including all participants, the relationship between 
average reliance behavior and condition was not significant (p=0.25). In a similar 
ANOVA excluding low investors, this relationship is still not significant, but potential 
differences start to emerge (p=0.16). Figure 21 shows the difference in average reliance 
behavior by condition between the two investment groups. While this relationship cannot 
be generalized with the current data, further studies with a-priori hypotheses and larger 
numbers of high investors could help clarify the existence or strength of any ties between 
reliance behavior and trust violation condition. 
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Figure 21.  Average Reliance by Investment Group 
Looking first at the high investors (left) in Figure 21, average reliance for both 
conditions was approximately equal during the first VST. After the trust violation, 
participants in the IBTV condition relied on BRIAN less, while those in the CBTV 
condition relied on BRIAN more. When considering just the low investors (right) in 
Figure 21, average reliance behavior post-violation increased for both conditions. Once 
again this seems to indicate that participants in the IBTV condition who invested (and 
lost) at least 50 percent of their points felt more of a trust violation than those who 
invested less than 50 percent.  
This behavior also again seems to suggest that participants in the CBTV condition 
either felt no trust violation or simply reacted differently because of the different trust 
violation. It is also possible that reliance behavior is more strongly related to trust when 
violations are integrity-based than when violations are competence-based. 
In reporting BRIAN’s performance, there was a trend towards significance 
(p=0.075) in which high investors reported BRIAN’s performance higher than low 
investors did, regardless of violation condition, F(1, 72)=3.25, p=0.075, ηp2=0.043. 
Table 10 delineates BRIAN’s average performance as reported by participants in 
each investment group, with one participant excluded due to missing data for this 
question. 
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Table 10.   Descriptive Statistics for Reported Performance by Investment Group 
 High Investors  Low Investors 








Figure 22 shows the relative difference in reported performance between the high 
and low investment groups, regardless of trust violation condition. 
 
Figure 22.  Reported Performance by Investment Group 
Personal investment behavior in the post-violation TIG could also be influenced 
by how many points were invested and lost during the pre-violation TIG, so this was 
compared. A split ANOVA showed no effect of investment behavior by condition and by 
investment group (p=0.42). Table 11 compares the descriptive statistics between all 
































Table 11.   Descriptive Statistics for Investment Behavior by Investment Group 
All Participants 
 IBTV (VST 1) IBTV (VST 2) CBTV (VST 1) CBTV (VST 2) 




































3. Swift Trust 
Sometimes called “swift trust,” there is a natural tendency in some people to trust 
others without much in the way of history or knowledge about that person to base their 
trust on. Since this tendency could have a significant effect on self-reported trust, it 
seemed interesting to compare data from participants with this tendency to those without. 
The swift-trust tendency in participants was measured by how they answered a question 
about their likelihood to provide their full name to someone they met on a bus after about 
ten minutes of conversation. Possible answers to this question included (1) no chance, (2) 
depends on if they seem trustworthy, (3) probably, and (4) very likely. To be 
conservative, participants responding with any answer other than (1) were considered 
“Swift Trustors.” 
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An ANOVA comparing BRIAN’s reported trustworthiness between violation 
conditions and the swift-trust tendency showed no effect (p=0.39) but still shows an 
interesting visual (Figure 23). 
 
Figure 23.  Reported Trustworthiness by Swift-Trust Tendency 
Looking at Figure 23, it may be interesting for future research to see if there is a 
difference here. Participants without the swift-trust tendency seem to have a somewhat 
wider gap between their reported trustworthiness of BRIAN between conditions. 
Although statistical significance does not support it here, this behavior could still be a 
slight suggestion that those who do not trust easily are more likely to perceive a 
difference between IBTVs and CBTVs by automation than swift trustors do. While it is 
an interesting thought, conclusions cannot be drawn from this data as it is; more studies 
would need to be done in a-priori hypothesis manner in order to prove any such 
relationship. 
4. Self-Efficacy 
Since reliance can be seen as the relative difference between trust in one’s own 




































questionnaire to reported trustworthiness ratings and also to overall reliance behavior. A 
regression analysis for each score separately found no significant correlation between 
self-efficacy and overall reliance behavior, p=0.77, or between self-efficacy and reported 
trustworthiness, p=0.40. 
5. PANAS 
It was also interesting to see whether trust violation condition caused any 
difference in participants’ mood, comparing pre-violation and post-violation answers on 
the Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS). A 2(IBTV, CBTV) X 2(Pre-violation, 
Post-violation) ANOVA was run for positive and negative affect separately. There was a 
main effect of positive affect, F(1, 97)=696.17, p=0.017, ηp2=0.057; but no interaction 
effect of positive affect by condition (p=0.46). 
These results show that participants had a higher average positive affect at the end 
of the experiment than at the beginning. Since positive affect is related to social activity 
and satisfaction [47], this could be an indication that interaction with BRIAN was enough 
like social interaction to boost this measure. It could also be accounted for by the two 
events preceding the second PANAS questionnaire, both of which had positive outcomes. 
During the second TIG, BRIAN returned half of the investment and half of the earnings, 
and during the extra points game, invested points were doubled. Figure 24 shows positive 
affect by condition, where the main effect can be seen in the consistent increase between 
the two questionnaires, regardless of condition. 
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Figure 24.  Positive Affect by Condition 
There was also a main effect of negative affect, F(1, 97)=696.17, p=0.017, 
ηp2=0.153; but no interaction effect of negative affect by condition (p=0.65). Negative 
affect is associated with stress and inability to cope well [47], so a decrease in average 
negative affect could mean that participants in general were not overly stressed by the 
trust violations. Figure 25 shows negative affect by condition, where the overall effect of 




Figure 25.  Negative Affect by Condition 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND THOUGHTS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
In this section, the most significant and interesting results are summarized and 
presented along with thoughts for future research into each area. A short discussion on 
what these results imply for HMT is also included. 
A. SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
The mean difference in reported trustworthiness was significantly lower in the 
IBTV condition as compared to the CBTV condition (p=0.026). Outliers found in this 
data set as previously discussed represent an important theoretical difference between 
violation conditions, and could represent a portion of the population for which 
automation committing an IBTV results in a severely low level of trust in automation. 
These outliers rated BRIAN as “not at all trustworthy,” which in a human-machine 
teaming scenario might mean they would choose not to rely on the automation even when 
they should. Including the outliers in the analysis was a choice based on a sensitivity 
analysis, but it is possible that the small number could be due to individual differences, 
even though they are all in the IBTV condition. This experiment should be replicated or 
adapted and conducted with other populations to see whether IBTVs consistently have 
this same effect. 
Participants averaged significantly faster response times during reliance decisions 
in the second VST than during the first (p<0.001). This is likely simply from practice at 
the task, but it is also possible that using the same pictures in the second round influenced 
response times. It is unclear whether trust in BRIAN had any effect on response times. If 
researchers replicate this experiment or perform something similar, it might be beneficial 
to use different pictures for the second VST. As long as the difficulty is equal between 
the two, this may yield a more accurate representation of time taken to make a reliance 
decision. 
Personal investment behavior was moderately different between the IBTV and 
CBTV conditions (p=0.075), suggesting that participants had some reason to choose 
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lower investment amounts in the IBTV condition. While this could be related to trust, 
further research should attempt to clarify what drives this difference in behavior. 
Personal investment behavior may be a better way to gauge trust levels than 
reliance behavior, if the goal is to measure trust without explicitly mentioning it. 
Investment trends between the TIGs are more in line with reported trust levels than 
reliance behavior for this experiment. Participants invested approximately equal 
percentages between violation conditions in the first TIG, and about 10 percent less for 
the IBTV condition than for the CBTV condition in the second TIG. This reflects 
reported trust levels, which were about 10 percent lower for IBTV participants than for 
CBTV participants. Reliance behavior on average showed equal reliance pre- and post-
violation in the IBTV condition, and actually showed an increase in reliance for the 
CBTV condition, which does not mirror reported trust. If investment behavior actually 
does reflect reported trust better than reliance behavior does, future research should 
experiment with more investment opportunities spaced throughout a task. This may offer 
an opportunity to look at trust in a more dynamic way without letting participants know 
directly that trust is being measured. 
Reliance behavior by iteration also differed from reported trust, showing no 
discernible trend other than a small, very interesting anomaly just after the trust violation 
in which reliance spiked for the IBTV condition and dipped for the CBTV condition. 
Future research should measure reliance by time or iteration again to see if this behavior 
just after violation is repeated or if it was simply a chance occurrence. 
Future replications or adaptations of this study should also make the competency-
based error less associable to the computer. Ensuring the error is associated only with 
BRIAN would remove the possibility that participants do not experience the CBTV and 
subsequently do not lose any trust in BRIAN. 
Lastly, a few interesting things were noted during exploratory analyses, though 
smaller N values and lack of a-priori hypotheses reduced any statistical validity. One of 
the most interesting comparisons was between high and low investors, where participants 
investing and subsequently losing higher amounts of points displayed behavior that 
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differed more between violation conditions. It is possible that one must feel highly 
invested in order to truly experience an IBTV from automation, or at least to experience it 
differently than a CBTV. Not only were all four outliers for reported trust in the high-
investment group, there were also interesting differences in looking at average reliance 
and perceived performance of the automation. Future research may yield more substantial 
results if participants are more personally invested in the task. Money or another prize 
more universally valued than made-up points should be used as the medium being lost 
through trust violations in order to get a more realistic response. Especially in the context 
of HMT in a military setting, most humans involved would have much more to lose 
through automation violating their trust than a few points. 
Swift trust tendencies had an effect similar to initial investment amount, where 
participants who were less inclined to trust swiftly had greater differences in behavior 
between conditions. Future research should measure this tendency in participants and 
attempt to see whether this effect is replicated in similar experiments. 
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR HMT 
If the results of this study are taken to mean that automation committing IBTVs 
results in lower trust levels than the same automation committing CBTVs, care should be 
taken in design and implementation of HMT technology to avoid automation actions 
which could be perceived by human teammates as an IBTV. This is especially important 
if the outliers previously shown actually do represent a portion of the population who are 
more sensitive to this type of violation. Trust levels that low (rating BRIAN “not at all 
trustworthy”) would certainly have a negative effect on performance of a human-machine 
team. 
Another important finding of this study is that participants investing (and losing) 
more points had a more significant difference in behavior between conditions than those 
who did not invest as much. Considering that many human-machine teams will be 
working within military environments, the humans on these teams will likely be highly 
invested in their teammate—possibly even placing their lives in the hands of the 
automation. Since high investors in this study seemed to be the group most negatively 
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affected by the IBTV, the behavior they displayed is likely the type of behavior to be 
expected within military HMT. 
While this experiment has resulted in some answers as to whether humans 
experience IBTVs by automation differently than CBTVs, it has also generated some 
more questions on the subject. The significant findings, interesting trends and 
correlations, and even the anomalies found in the process all offer seeds of thought for 
future research in this area. Results of this study and future replications or adaptations 
could provide vital information for use as humans and machines learn to become 
teammates. As a humble offering, it is hoped that this research stands as a solid first step 
towards looking at integrity-based trust violations within human-machine teaming. 
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